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BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
LEGAL REALISM 
WILLIAM E. NELSON* 
We are here today to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. 
Board of Education,1 surely the most important case decided in the Twentieth 
Century by the Supreme Court of the United States.  Over the past half-
century, Brown has come to “[define] the central values of constitutional 
adjudication in the United States.”2  It has even been called “the single most 
honored opinion in the Supreme Court’s [entire] corpus.”3 
There are many reasons not merely to commemorate but even to celebrate 
Brown.  The most salient is that the Court’s decision marked the beginning of 
the end of the heinous system of formal de jure segregation of blacks from 
whites that had prevailed throughout the South for some three quarters of a 
century.4  Segregation had grown up in the aftermath of Reconstruction as a 
means to keep the former slaves in a condition of subordination.5  Whatever 
doubts might have existed about its legality were erased when the Supreme 
Court declared in Plessy v. Ferguson that separate facilities for African-
Americans were constitutional as long as they were physically equal to 
facilities for whites.6  In fact, they almost never were.  Indeed, both before and 
after Plessy, segregation had the purpose and effect of “constantly pushing the 
Negro farther down.”7 
 
* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University.  A.B., Hamilton College, 1962; 
J.D., New York University, 1965; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1971.  The author is indebted to his 
colleagues in the Legal History Colloquium at New York University for their criticisms and 
suggestions, as well as to Joel Goldstein and Daniel Hulsebosch of St. Louis University.  He is 
also indebted for research support to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty 
Research Fund of New York University School of Law. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (1991). 
 3. Jack M. Balkin, Introduction to WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE 
SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS 
DECISION 4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
 4. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 5. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22-29 (3d ed. 1974). 
 6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-52 (1896). 
 7. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 108.  See generally id. at 97-109. 
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Thirteen years later, with the founding of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),8 blacks began their slow climb up 
the mountain of equality.  Another generation passed before Charles Hamilton 
Houston reorganized the Howard Law School into a center for the training of 
civil rights lawyers.9  Within a few more years, the Supreme Court, in Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, held for the first time that a separate educational 
track for African Americans—in this instance, an out-of-state law school—
violated the Equal Protection Clause.10  After several other decisions,11 the five 
cases that ultimately were consolidated into Brown v. Board of Education12 
and Bolling v. Sharpe13 came before the Court.  They were first argued in the 
October 1952 Term, put over for reargument to the next term, and finally 
decided on May 17, 1954.14 The opinion directing the dismantling of 
segregation in the South “with all deliberate speed” was not issued until yet 
another year had passed.15  Sixteen years later, the Court affirmed the use of 
busing to achieve integration,16 but then, in the 1974 case of Milliken v. 
Bradley, it slowed integration efforts by prohibiting busing across municipal 
and school district boundaries.17  The result of all these cases is that de jure 
segregation is unconstitutional and Southern schools are no longer totally 
segregated, as they were a half-century ago.18  But residential segregation and 
all its untoward consequences are worse than ever, particularly in Northern 
cities.19  Thus, while there is reason for celebration, the celebration should be 
somewhat restrained.  Brown put an end to an era of wicked law, but it failed 
to end racism, as many of us in the trenches during the past five decades had 
hoped it would. 
Brown v. Board of Education also “contributed,” to quote Mark Tushnet, 
“to the development of a pervasive ‘rights consciousness’ among the people of 
 
 8. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 1 (1987). 
 9. See id. at 30-31, 35-36. 
 10. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 306 U.S. 337, 352 (1938). 
 11. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 
(1948). 
 12. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. 
 13. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 14. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. 
 15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 16. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 17. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974). 
 18. For statistics on the first two decades of desegregation in public schools in the South, see 
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
345-47 (1991). 
 19. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
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the United States generally.”20  Brown was the first case in which the Supreme 
Court struck down numerous laws of many states in order to protect individual 
civil, as distinguished from economic, rights.  Baker v. Carr21 and the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure revolution22 followed, and by the end of the 1960s 
people had begun to expect that the courts, rather than other institutions, would 
protect their constitutional rights.  Roe v. Wade23 and Lawrence v. Texas24 are 
both an outgrowth and a confirmation of that expectation.  More deeply, 
Americans of all groups, as a result of Brown, have grown to understand that 
they have rights and that those rights can be enforced through law.  Most of us 
think that this “rights consciousness” is a cause for celebration. 
Finally, Brown v. Board of Education marked the birth of the Supreme 
Court’s claim, first announced four years later in Cooper v. Aaron25 and 
brought to fruition in recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court,26 that the Court, 
in the words of my colleague Larry Kramer, should be the “sovereign” and not 
simply the “supreme” interpreter of the Constitution.27  Cooper, which 
“declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution,” told all state officials that they had 
no power to ignore or reject the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown and, 
indeed, that their oaths bound them to enforce it.28  Some forty years later, City 
of Boerne v. Flores informed members of Congress that, despite Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, they too had no power to ignore or reject the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, indeed, that 
their oaths bound them to enforce it.29  Bush v. Gore30 fully displayed the 
Court’s belief in its primacy over the other branches of government, as have 
the federalism cases culminating in United States v. Morrison.31  Proponents of 
 
 20. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 2, at 1867. 
 21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 22. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
398-99 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 654-55 (1961). 
 23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 24. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 25. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 26. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 128-69 
(2001). 
 27. Id. at 13.  The words Kramer uses are “sovereignty” and “supremacy,” not “sovereign” 
and “supreme.”  Id. 
 28. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
 29. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997). 
 30. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
 31. 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (2000); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999); United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).  But see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 
1981-82 (2003).  For a general discussion of these cases, see Kramer, supra note 26, at 137-58 
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a robustly empowered Supreme Court—and there will be many among the 
readers of this Article—can find cause for celebration here as well, even if they 
do not agree with all of the substantive results the Court has reached. 
These matters of celebration, however, are not my subject.  Indeed, Brown 
v. Board of Education itself is not my subject.  What I plan to address is a shift 
in emphasis in the jurisprudence of legal realism—a shift that is connected to 
Brown but obviously more complex than Brown. 
Let me define my topic from the bottom up.  Throughout the Twentieth 
Century, the legal academy has fixated on the death of formalism, the birth of 
legal realism, and the triumph of the latter over the former during the New 
Deal’s constitutional revolution of 1937.32  I have no doubt that the change 
from formalism to realism occurred and that the change was important.  The 
legal realists have dominated the jurisprudential landscape of America since 
the 1930s. 
But it is a mistake to view realism as a phenomenon that thereafter did not 
change, as most scholars have done.33  An important intellectual move on the 
part of those who see realism as such a phenomenon has been to distinguish it 
from a predecessor movement, known as sociological jurisprudence.  Again, I 
do not doubt that sociological jurisprudence and realism can be understood as 
different phenomena,34 although I agree with Morton Horwitz that the 
 
and Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric 
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 32. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 175-76, 208-25 (1998); 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-36 (1995); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS 
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (1973); 
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 13-32 (2000); G. Edward White, 
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. 
REV. 279, 279-82 (1973). 
 33. The Transformation of American Law is the only scholarship that analyzes in depth how 
legal realism did change over the course of the decades since 1930.  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-
268 (1992).  As the pages that follow will show, I agree with Horwitz’s analysis in one important 
respect.  I agree that legal realists can be divided into two groups—first, those who “turn to social 
science research [as] a direct extension of pre-war Progressive sociological jurisprudence,” and 
second, those who “insist” that law should be grounded in “a better system of political values.”  
Id. at 209.  But I disagree with him in two respects: (1) I do not think, as I understand Horwitz 
does, that both groups have been equally prominent in the realist movement at all times in its 
history.  Instead, I will argue that those who focused on the relation between law and society were 
dominant until the 1950s, especially in the judiciary, while those concerned with political values 
became dominant thereafter, and (2) unlike Horwitz, I do not believe that the shift from the first 
to the second form of realism, which occurred in the 1950s, was entirely a change for the better. 
 34. For some of the outstanding work that so understands them, see N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE 
POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997), LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 1-46 (1986) and G. Edward White, From 
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difference is more one of tone and style than of substance.35  My main 
objection, however, to drawing a line in 1930 to mark the shift from 
sociological jurisprudence to realism is that such a line obscures another—and, 
I think, more important—jurisprudential change that occurred in connection 
with Brown v. Board of Education.  This Article focuses on this later change. 
I need to begin by defining a legal realist as anyone, including a 
practitioner of sociological jurisprudence,36 who rejects formalism’s faith that 
judges can derive results in hard cases deductively from nonpolitical, neutral, 
and objective sources of law such as cases and statutes.  A realist believes that 
judges must bring something else to the table.  But what else?  Here I need to 
draw an overly sharp, analytical distinction.  On the one hand, a judge might 
see herself as an agent of society who is under a duty to make law conform to 
the wishes of society.  If such a judge thinks of society as a train, law will 
appear as the caboose at the end of the train, and the judge’s job will be to keep 
the caboose on the same track as the train.  On the other hand, a judge might 
see himself as society’s commander.  Looking upon society as a train, law will 
emerge as the engine, and the judge as the engineer who must determine the 
direction that the train ultimately will take. 
Of course, law is both an engine and a caboose.  Nevertheless, we 
sometimes tend to think of it more as one than the other.  My hypothesis is that 
until Brown, legal thinkers tended to see law as a caboose and the judge as 
someone who tidied up and ensured that law was following in the direction 
society was leading.  Since Brown, our emphasis has shifted, and we now tend 
to look upon law more as the engine that will dictate the course society will 
take. 
Part I of this Article will concentrate on this shift in emphasis betweeen the 
1920s and the 1980s in judicial and academic views about law and the nature 
of the judicial process.  Then, in Part II, I hope to show how the ideas of the 
 
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-
Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972). 
 35. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 169-70, 174, 176, 185.  Horwitz takes note of the 
impertinence, irreverence, and iconoclasm of the realists while calling “[r]ealism . . . a 
continuation of the Progressive attack on the attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal 
Thought to . . . portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical.”  Id. at 170. 
 36. I actually have no stake in the use of the term “legal realism.”  What I do care about is 
viewing all antiformalists from the 1920s forward as a single group, so that I can compare the 
antiformalism of the 1920s with that of a later era, especially the 1980s, in order to identify a 
change in antiformalism that prior scholars have overlooked.  My project requires me to treat 
what has been called sociological jurisprudence as comparable to what has been called realism in 
order to focus on a change in emphasis not directly connected to what others have seen as the 
transformation of sociological jurisprudence into realism.  A focus on the distinction between 
sociological jurisprudence and realism tends to obscure the later change on which I am focusing, 
whereas seeing the two movements as part of a larger antiformalist phenomenon makes the 1950s 
change about which I care emerge more clearly. 
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1920s persisted into the early 1950s, and how the Court’s opinion in Brown 
could have been written consistently with those ideas.  In Part III, we will see 
that Chief Justice Earl Warren did not so write the opinion, and we will 
examine how the academy, in response to what he did write, began to articulate 
new views about law and judging.  My claim will be that the legal academy’s 
reaction to Brown undermined a conception of realism inherited from the 
1920s—a notion that judges should conform legal doctrine to emerging 
societal needs and values.  In place of this old conception, a new pluralist 
vision emerged, in which judges are expected to infuse the law with their own 
personally held, but typically discordant, values of political morality. 
Finally, Part IV will analyze why we should, on the one hand, regret and, 
on the other hand, applaud this transformation in the concept of realism.  I will 
argue that the academy’s reaction to Brown moved America away from a 
jurisprudence of inherently progressive courts, such as the Warren Court, 
toward a deeply fractured legal culture in which conservative courts, such as 
the Court that decided Bush v. Gore,37 again have become possible.  I view this 
change as cause for regret, though others will celebrate it.  At the same time, 
the infusion of discordant moral values into the law can help discrete and 
insular minorities enter the mainstream of American political dialogue.  For 
me, this development is cause for celebration, but those who celebrate Bush v. 
Gore will likely disagree. 
I 
The Twentieth Century began with what Morton Horwitz has labeled 
“[t]he Progressive attack on Classical Legal Thought.”38  In broad outline, 
which is all that is required here, the Nineteenth Century’s classical ideal 
envisioned a body of nonpolitical, neutral, and objective legal doctrine that 
could mediate between the state and society and among contending forces 
within society.39  Beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes in the last decade of 
the Nineteenth and the opening decade of the Twentieth Century, progressives 
challenged this orthodox view.  They argued that law was political and 
subjective and that many legal decisionmakers were prejudiced in favor of 
corporate entrepreneurs.40  By the 1920s, according to Horwitz, legal realism 
had been born.41 
But realism has not remained as a constant.  Important emphases changed 
in the aftermath of Brown.  A comparison of two important books—the one 
 
 37. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 38. HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 4. 
 39. See id. at 9-31. 
 40. See id. at 109-62. 
 41. See id. at 169-70. 
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published thirty-three years before Brown,42 and the other published thirty-two 
years after43—will illustrate.  Both books begin with the fundamental realist 
insight that preexisting formal legal materials, especially statutes and judicial 
precedents, often do not dictate results.44  Both see law as a policy-oriented 
science.  But they differ significantly in their understanding of the ultimate 
sources from which judges sculpt their policy judgments. 
The first book is Benjamin N. Cardozo’s, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process.45  For Cardozo, the supreme source of law was “social welfare”46 or 
the “welfare of society.”47  Later in his book, Cardozo called his approach “the 
method of sociology.”48  Conceding the vagueness of his terminology,49 
Cardozo suggested that the method of sociology called upon a judge “‘to 
ascertain . . . what ordering of the social life of the community comports best 
with the aim of the law in question in the circumstances before him’”50 or with 
“the mores of the community,” with its “ethics or . . . social sense of justice, 
whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common mind.”51 
Cardozo was clear that the “standard” for judges who used the method of 
sociology “must be an objective one.”52  Judges were not “free to substitute 
their own ideas of reason and justice for those of the men and women whom 
they serve.”53  They were not “commissioned to set aside existing rules at 
pleasure in favor of any other set of rules which they may hold to be expedient 
or wise.”54  When judges were “called upon to say how far existing rules 
[were] to be extended or restricted,” their duty was to “let the welfare of 
society fix the path, its direction and its distance.”55  Cardozo understood, of 
course, that his demand for objectivity provided “no assurance that judges 
[would] interpret the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other 
men;”56 it demanded only that the judge “shall search for social justice” along 
paths fixed by society, not by the policy preferences of the judge.57 
 
 42. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
 43. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 44. See CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 14-23, 40-43; DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 24-26. 
 45. CARDOZO, supra note 42. 
 46. Id. at 71-72. 
 47. Id. at 66. 
 48. Id. at 98-102. 
 49. Id. at 71-73. 
 50. CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 90 (quoting LORENZ BRUTT, DIE KUNST DER 
RECHTSANWENDUNG 57 (1907)). 
 51. Id. at 72. 
 52. Id. at 89. 
 53. Id. at 88-89. 
 54. Id. at 66-67. 
 55. CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 67. 
 56. Id. at 135. 
 57. Id. at 137. 
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This is a lecture about constitutionalism, and some listeners might want me 
to say a word about how Cardozo’s writing about common-law adjudication, 
expressed in The Nature of the Judicial Process, fit with his constitutional 
decision-making.  I find the fit nearly perfect.  In constitutional as well as 
common law cases, Cardozo ultimately gave effect to societal needs and 
values.  For example, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, Cardozo in dissent 
asserted that separation of powers was “not a doctrinaire concept,” but had to 
be used with “elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities 
of government.”58  And, in Palko v. Connecticut, he focused on societal 
values—on “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”59 
The second book is by Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire.60  Dworkin agrees 
with Cardozo that judges must rely on something in addition to precedent, their 
conception of judicial role, and their sense of craft in reaching judgments.  
Dworkin also agrees that a judge’s task is to interpret society’s values,61 not to 
impose her own.  But, unlike Cardozo, Dworkin recognizes that society’s 
values sometimes will be ambivalent.62  When they are, the judge must point 
societal values in one direction rather than in another to make them “the best 
these can be.”63  And, in so directing them, the judge must have recourse to 
“political morality,”64 not to the societal needs or preferences themselves. 
Dworkin argues that right political morality is objectively true and thus 
transcends the mere policy preferences of judges.  Much of his book consists 
of a brilliant analytical attack on what he calls both external and internal 
skepticism.65  Dworkin’s claim of objectivity is difficult to maintain, however, 
in a constitutional culture that venerates political and religious equality and 
pluralism.  Jeremy Waldron explains the problem as well as anyone.  “A 
confident theorist of justice,” Waldron writes: 
[Might] announce, . . . “[o]f course, there is disagreement about justice; but . . . 
the existence of disagreement is quite compatible with one of the contestant 
views being true and the others false.”  He can say that, but it is hardly 
sufficient, particularly if it is just a prelude to his saying, “And of course the 
 
 58. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935). 
 59. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  I am indebted to John C.P. Goldberg 
for these insights about Cardozo’s constitutional cases.  See John C.P. Goldberg, Community and 
the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1324 (1990); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (1999) 
(reviewing ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998)). 
 60. DWORKIN, supra note 43. 
 61. See id. at 225, 255. 
 62. See id. at 255-56. 
 63. Id. at 255. 
 64. Id. at 249, 256.  I am not alone in so reading Dworkin.  See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, 
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 203-04 (1999). 
 65. See DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 31-86. 
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true view of justice is my view . . . .”  For if he is at all self-aware, he knows 
very well that he will be followed, one by one, by his ideological rivals, each 
making a similar announcement in similarly self-assured tones. . . . [E]ven 
among those who accept the proposition that some views about justice are true 
and others false, disagreement will persist as to which is which.66 
If Waldron is correct that America’s constitutional pluralism inevitably 
means that judges will ground judgments in claims of political morality that 
are at war with each other, then we need to understand Dworkin as describing a 
jurisprudence in which the differing, individual moral values of judges 
legitimately play a role in the process by which they arrive at their decisions.  
A judge cannot seriously expect to persuade another judge whose political 
morality differs from hers that she is right and he is wrong, although as 
political actors we might and, indeed, probably should oppose confirmation of 
a judicial nominee with whom we disagree. 
This diversion brings me back to what I see as a key difference between 
Cardozo and Dworkin.  Cardozo insisted that judges supplement the 
professional sources of law with an objectively verifiable analysis of societal 
needs and values.  Dworkin, on the other hand, would ultimately have judges 
work from their disparate views of proper political morality.  In Cardozo’s 
world, law is intrinsically progressive; because it is a derivative of social fact, 
it changes over time in whatever fashion society as a whole progresses over 
time.  In Dworkin’s world, in contrast, there is room for judges whose political 
morality dictates that law should not change or that law should revert to some 
previous golden age.  Unlinked from the direction of social change, the law can 
move in whatever direction those who happen to inhabit the bench succeed in 
moving it.  Cardozo, in short, saw law as a caboose that should follow 
whatever course the societal train takes.  Dworkin, in contrast, sees law as an 
engine of political morality that can keep the train steady or move it in 
whatever direction those at the throttle can command. 
II 
A. 
The Supreme Court created by the New Deal after 1937, of which Cardozo 
himself was briefly a member, largely abided by Cardozo’s understanding of 
the nature of the judicial process and thus developed into a strong force for 
progressive change.  The current Court, in contrast, consists not only of 
progressives, but also of conservatives who think that law should remain 
 
 66. WALDRON, supra note 64, at 3. 
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stable67 and reactionaries who would revert to a past golden age.68  What 
caused this shift of emphasis in our understanding of how the judiciary should 
go about doing its job? 
I must concede that the shift is not as sharp as I have so far portrayed it to 
be.  As early as the late 1930s, Judge Charles Clark urged that judicial 
decisions depended not on society’s, but on the individual judge’s “values and 
his notions of sound and desirable social policy.”69  Before coming to the 
bench, Jerome Frank likewise observed that “[t]he peculiar traits, disposition, 
biases and habits of the particular judge will . . . often determine what he 
decides to be the law.”70  Karl Llewellyn has often been associated with the 
Clark-Frank position as a result of his statement that someone seeking to know 
“the true measure of the law” must look, on a case-by-case basis, at “what, in 
particular, can or will anybody do about it, here and now.”71 
Nonetheless, as I have argued in my recent book on the legal history of 
Twentieth-Century New York, Cardozo’s jurisprudential vision remained 
dominant into the 1950s.72  One key figure who at least started in agreement 
with Cardozo was his colleague, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.  At the same time 
that Cardozo was working on The Nature of the Judicial Process, Stone wrote 
that “[t]he entire history of our law has been one of change and adaptation to 
meet new conditions, social and economic, and to conform to a more 
enlightened ethical perception.”73  Three decades later, Henry M. Hart and 
 
 67. Justice O’Connor has publicly expressed this view.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 
2472, 2484 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 861-69 (1992). 
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating a 
return to “original understanding”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
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 69. Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939). 
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 71. K.N. Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 485, 488 (1935).  Of course, Holmes 
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Albert M. Sacks, whose The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law74 typically reflected mid-Twentieth-Century jurisprudential 
values, cited the famous Warren and Brandeis article on The Right to Privacy75 
for the proposition that “‘the common law . . . grows to meet the demands of 
society.’”76  Likewise, their mentor, Justice Felix Frankfurter, rejected the view 
that a judge should bring his own political morality to bear on decision-
making.  According to Frankfurter, he was “not justified in writing my private 
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish 
them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.”77 
At least for a few years, Cardozo’s jurisprudential vision dominated the 
Court.  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, for one, followed the views of his 
junior colleague in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, when he rejected 
the claim that “the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which 
the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed” 
upon it and instead construed it in accordance with “a growing recognition of 
public needs.”78  Cardozo’s approach also commanded eight votes in the 1940 
case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the first full-scale effort by the 
Supreme Court to address the contentious issue of whether Jehovah’s 
Witnesses should be compelled to salute the American flag.79  In writing the 
opinion for the majority, Justice Frankfurter surely overstated the Cardozian 
argument, but that must not cause us to lose sight of the argument’s structure.  
It was an argument about societal needs.  Following citations of precedent, 
Frankfurter said: 
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant 
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of 
political responsibilities. . . . In all these cases the general laws in question, 
upheld in their application to those who refused obedience from religious 
conviction, were manifestations of specific powers of government deemed by 
the legislature essential to secure and maintain that orderly, tranquil, and free 
society without which religious toleration itself is unattainable. . . . [T]he 
question remains whether school children, like the Gobitis children, must be 
excused from conduct required of all the other children in the promotion of 
national cohesion.  We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in the 
 
 74. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994). 
 75. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 76. HART & SACKS, supra note 74, at 450 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 75, at 
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 77. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 78. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934). 
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hierarchy of legal values.  National unity is the basis of national security.  To 
deny the legislature the right to select appropriate means for its attainment 
presents a totally different order of problem from that of the propriety of 
subordinating the possible ugliness of littered streets to the free expression of 
opinion through distribution of handbills.80 
Another case from the same year combined both elements of Cardozo’s 
approach.  The case was Chambers v. Florida, where the Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Hugo Black, invalidated the state’s use of a coerced confession to 
obtain a criminal conviction.81  The nation’s need in 1940, as war against 
nazism and fascism was brewing, was to define itself as different from 
Germany, and courts understood that their job was to articulate the difference 
by portraying how America’s developing values differed from those of Nazi 
Germany.82  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Hugo Black accordingly 
spoke of how “the exalted power of some governments to punish manufactured 
crime dictatorially [was] the handmaid of tyranny,”83 and he promised that 
American courts would serve as “havens of refuge for those who might 
otherwise suffer because they [were] helpless, weak, outnumbered, or . . . non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”84  Echoes of 
Chambers were still being heard four years later in an internal memo that 
spoke of the efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund “to have the principles 
of the ‘Four Freedoms’ made applicable” in cases pending before the Supreme 
Court.85 
A fourth case was Korematsu v. United States, where the Court upheld the 
validity of an order directing Americans of Japanese ancestry who lived in 
specified areas to report for transportation to internment camps.86  Again, the 
case was about conforming the law to what the nation needed in wartime.  The 
Court, in its opinion by Justice Black, said: 
[That it could not] “reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities 
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population . . . . We 
 
 80. Id. at 594-95.  Of course, Gobitis was overruled three years later in West Virginia State 
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cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have 
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be 
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national 
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be 
taken to guard against it.” 
. . . . 
In doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . upon a large 
group of American citizens.  But hardships are part of war, and war is an 
aggregation of hardships. . . . Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens 
from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is 
inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.  But when under 
conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the 
power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.87 
Then there was Dennis v. United States, where the Court upheld the 
convictions of members of the Communist Party for conspiring to advocate the 
overthrow of the government.88  The main issue in the case was whether the 
activities of party members constituted a clear and present danger, and that 
depended, in turn, on the meaning of the clear and present danger test.89  Chief 
Justice Fred Vinson’s plurality opinion echoed the thoughts of Cardozo and the 
earlier opinions we have been examining, notably Gobitis and Korematsu.  
According to Vinson, no “shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a rigid 
rule to be applied inflexibly.”90  The clear and present danger test, like 
separation of powers, was “not a doctrinaire concept,” but had to be used with 
“elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of 
government.”91  “Nothing [was] more certain” for Vinson “than the principle 
that there are no absolutes. . . . To those who would paralyze our Government 
in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we 
must reply that all concepts are relative.”92  Justice Frankfurter, in his 
concurring opinion, agreed: 
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such 
exceptions would eventually corrode the rules.  The demands of free speech in 
a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better 
served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests . . . than by 
announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be 
solved.93 
 
 87. Id. at 218-20 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)). 
 88. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-517 (1953). 
 89. Id. at 508. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 92. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508. 
 93. Id. at 524-25. 
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Cardozo’s idea that law should respond to societal needs even appeared in 
one of the desegregation cases leading up to Brown, McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents.94  There, the issue was whether an African-American could be 
kept separate from other students in a graduate program.95  The Supreme 
Court’s answer, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Vinson, was that, as 
“[o]ur society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders 
increases correspondingly,” a graduate program like the segregated Oklahoma 
one that “handicapped” a student “in his pursuit of effective graduate 
instruction” that would transform him into “a leader and trainer of others” 
would be unconstitutional.96 
The persistence through the 1940s of the idea that law should change in 
response to societal needs and values also emerges in the writings of those who 
criticized it, especially a group of Roman Catholic scholars who were 
advancing what they saw as the theological position of their church.97  As these 
Catholic scholars argued, legal realists understood that judges decided cases 
“not by reference to precedent and principle, but by reference to present or 
becoming social customs, institutions, and patterns.”98  Law had only “one 
moral measure, Society’s will.”99  According to the Catholics, “no moral 
oughts” bound the realists, which led to “a rather disagreeable (ugly) 
conclusion”—that “physical force or might makes right.”100  Not surprisingly, 
Catholic theorists objected to “a theory that discards moral powers and moral 
ought, that eliminates God and soul,” and that “elevates a blind unfolding 
dominant social pattern force to the throne of omnipotence.”101  These Roman 
Catholic scholars, however, did not hold professorships in the nation’s most 
powerful, elite law schools, and accordingly the view that did dominate the 
elite schools—that law should change in response to dominant societal 
forces—persisted. 
The notion that societal forces rather than political morality should dictate 
results also surfaced throughout the Supreme Court’s internal discussions of 
Brown.  In a memorandum that he drafted for his own private purposes, Justice 
Felix Frankfurter reiterated his view that: 
[I]t is not our duty to express our personal attitudes toward these issues 
however deep our individual convictions may be.  The opposite is true.  It is 
 
 94. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
 95. Id. at 638. 
 96. Id. at 641. 
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our duty not to express our merely personal views.  However passionately any 
of us may hold egalitarian views, . . . he travels outside his judicial authority if 
for this private reason alone he declares unconstitutional the policy of 
segregation.102 
Justice Robert Jackson agreed that “we can not oversimplify this decision to be 
a mere expression of our personal opinion that school segregation is unwise or 
evil.  We have not been chosen as legislators but as judges.”103  Jackson’s law 
clerk from the term preceding the one in which Brown was decided, the future 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, agreed that, “[i]f this Court, because its 
members individually are ‘liberals’ and dislike segregation, now chooses to 
strike it down, it differs from the McReynolds court only in the kinds of 
litigants it favors and the kinds of special claims it protects.”104 
Accordingly, the justices set out in their private thinking to identify the 
societal changes that made the abolition of segregation necessary and 
appropriate. Justice Frankfurter proclaimed the orthodoxy. In his 
memorandum, he declared that equal protection: 
[I]s not a fixed formula defined with finality at a particular time.  It does not 
reflect, as a congealed summary, the social arrangements and beliefs of a 
particular epoch.  It is addressed to the changes wrought by time and not 
merely the changes that are the consequences of physical development.  Law 
must respond to transformation of views as well as to that of outward 
circumstances.  The effect of changes in men’s feelings for what is right and 
just is equally relevant in determining whether a discrimination denies the 
equal protection of the laws.105 
Justice Harold H. Burton articulated an equally orthodox, though vague 
position.  He noted: 
[He was] increasingly impressed with the idea that under the conditions of 50 
or more years ago it probably could be said that a state’s treatment of negroes, 
within its borders, on the basis of “separate but equal” facilities might come 
within the constitutional guaranty of an “equal” protection of the laws, because 
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the lives of negroes and whites were then and there in fact separately cast and 
lived.  Today, however, I doubt that it can be said in any state (and certainly 
not generally) that compulsory “separation” of the races, even with equal 
facilities, can amount to an “equal” protection of the laws in a society that is 
lived and shared so “jointly” by all races as ours is now.106 
At least in a political context, the new Chief Justice, Earl Warren, likewise 
would “not shrink from the known needs of social progress.”107 
But it was Justice Jackson, as much as anyone on the Court, who strove in 
a memorandum circulated only within his own chambers to identify what had 
changed in America so as to require that segregation now be outlawed.  
Jackson was clear that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had not 
intended to outlaw segregation and hence that Plessy v. Ferguson108 was not 
necessarily wrongly decided.109  But he also agreed with Cardozo that the 
generalities of the Constitution “have a content and a significance that vary 
from age to age”110 and thus knew that Plessy and the framers had not bound 
his Court.  Still, if the Court were to overrule Plessy, “intellectual honesty”111 
demanded that it identify factors that could account for the change over time.  
What might those factors be? 
One such factor was public opinion, which had undergone “profound 
change” as a result of the “awful consequences of racial prejudice revealed 
by . . . the Nazi regime.”112  A second was education.  In the late Nineteenth 
Century, education, at one time a privilege for the few, had become “a right 
and more than that a duty, to be performed not merely for one’s own advantage 
but for the security and stability of the nation.”113  Third, African-Americans 
themselves, according to Jackson, had changed.  Unlike the late Nineteenth-
Century freedmen, “who had had no chance ‘to show their capacity for 
education or assimilation,’”114 Jackson was convinced that by the mid-
Twentieth Century, “assimilation [was] under way to a marked extent” and that 
“the mere fact that one [was] in some degree colored no longer create[d] a 
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presumption that he [was] inferior, illiterate, retarded or indigent.”115  
Jackson’s memorandum thus had some interesting and provocative ideas, but 
as Richard Kluger notes, it “left a good deal to be desired as a state paper.”116  
It was far removed from becoming an opinion for the Court. 
B. 
At this point, I should restate one of my main themes—namely, that until 
the time Brown v. Board of Education was decided, mainstream American 
legal thinkers tended to reject the idea that courts should turn to the political 
morality of judges as a basis for deciding cases.  Law, instead, usually was 
expected to change in response to societal needs and values. 
Two outstanding books—one by Robert J. Cottrol, Raymond T. Diamond, 
and Leland B. Ware, Brown v. Board of Education: Caste, Culture, and the 
Constitution117 and the other by Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: 
Race and the Image of American Democracy118—show that materials existed 
in the 1950s to decide Brown consistently with this dominant jurisprudence.  
Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware show how “the collective values, tastes, 
prejudices, [and] even the reflexes” of American society demanded that 
segregation be ended,119 while Dudziak examines how America’s goal of 
“promot[ing] democracy among peoples of color around the world was 
seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”120 
Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware begin by examining the work of early 
Twentieth-Century African-American scholars who, by rejecting then-
dominant assumptions of white superiority, laid a foundation for subsequent 
racial progress.121  World War I was more important, as it showed some two 
hundred thousand African-Americans who served in the military as well as the 
many more who migrated to Northern cities that the South’s Jim Crow system 
was not the inevitable order of things.122  These developments began to bear 
fruit during the New Deal, when the administration courted the Northern black 
vote and the first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, became a champion of the cause of 
civil rights.123 
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World War II forced more rapid change.  The manpower demands of the 
war brought more than one million African-Americans into the military, often 
in combat and sometimes leadership roles that would have been inconceivable 
only a few years earlier.124  At the same time, industry’s needs led to a great 
migration that ultimately transformed the nation’s minority population “from 
one that was largely rural and southern to one that was increasingly urban and 
located in the more liberal North and West.”125  Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware 
note that: 
[The war also forced Americans] to take a hard, awful look at where racism 
could lead.  That look began when ordinary men, GIs in the European theater, 
stumbled across not only the unbelievable but the inconceivable: killing 
grounds with names like Dachau, Buchenwald, Malthausen.  These camps left 
an impression that would never be erased in the minds of the men who actually 
walked through them, including their commanding general, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.  The Nuremberg trials, as well as massive press coverage of Nazi 
atrocities, served to inform the wider American public of the horrors of the 
Third Reich’s Final Solution.  All of this would help make the kind of easy yet 
deep racial prejudice common earlier in the century far less respectable after 
the Second World War.126 
Popular culture changed as a result.  Hollywood began to portray blacks as 
equal and heroic,127 and Jackie Robinson’s integration of major league baseball 
was “a turning point in the history of American race relations that should not 
be underestimated.”128  Robinson made a hero of color a routine icon in 
American life. 
Slowly law and public policy began to change as well.  President Franklin 
Roosevelt was forced to appoint the first African-American general and to sign 
a fair employment practices order barring discrimination in defense 
industries.129  In 1948, his successor, Harry Truman, signed executive orders 
barring discrimination in the federal civil service and in the military.130 
Mary Dudziak picks up the story in detail where Cottrol, Diamond, and 
Ware leave off.  She shows how the Cold War struggle against Soviet Russia 
was impeded by the continuation of racial injustice in America.  One element 
in the Cold War was to win the benevolent neutrality, if not the allegiance, of 
what we now view as third world countries, most of whose people are dark-
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skinned.131  Dudziak shows how people from those nations were offended by 
reports of discrimination against African-Americans in the United States, and 
were angered when their own people arrived in Washington as government 
representatives, in college towns as students, or in other cities as businessmen 
and faced the same discrimination as dark Americans.132  She also shows how 
the Communist press and media exploited racial incidents for propaganda 
purposes.133 
The impact of racial injustice on American foreign policy greatly troubled 
State Department officials such as Chester Bowles, the ambassador to India.  
In a 1952 speech, Bowles observed: 
A year, a month, or even a week in Asia is enough to convince any perceptive 
American that the colored peoples of Asia and Africa, who total two-thirds of 
the world’s population, seldom think about the United States without 
considering the limitations under which our 13 million Negroes are living.134 
These third world people were “convinced that, solely because of their color, 
many Americans are denied a fair share in the life of the richest nation on 
earth, and in their ears this conviction gives our claim to world leadership a 
distinctly hollow ring.”135  Confident that he had “not exaggerated” because it 
was “impossible to exaggerate,”136  Bowles concluded: “How much does all 
our talk of democracy mean, if we do not practice it at home? . . .  How can the 
colored peoples of Asia be sure we are sincere in our interest in them if we do 
not respect the equality of our colored people at home?”137  As Dudziak shows, 
numerous Americans, both in government and outside of government, were 
conscious of and repeated Bowles’s central points.  A key person was Supreme 
Court Justice William O. Douglas, who, on a 1950 trip to India, was quickly 
asked why America tolerated the lynching of blacks.138  When he published a 
book about the trip the next year, Douglas wrote of “color consciousness” as 
“an important consideration in the warmth of India’s relations to the outside 
world” and of “the attitude of the United States toward its colored minorities 
[as] a powerful factor in our relations with India.”139 
More importantly, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations brought 
these matters to the attention of the Supreme Court in amicus curiae briefs filed 
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on behalf of the United States in the Brown litigation.  One of these briefs 
reminded the Court that “[i]t is in the context of the present world struggle 
between freedom and tyranny that the problem of race discrimination must be 
viewed.”140  The brief then quoted Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who said: 
During the past six years, the damage to our foreign relations . . . has become 
progressively greater.  The United States is under constant attack in the foreign 
press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies as the United 
Nations because of various practices of discrimination against minority groups 
in this country.  As might be expected, Soviet spokesmen regularly exploit this 
situation in propaganda against the United States, both within the United 
Nations and through radio broadcasts and the press, which reaches all corners 
of the world.  Some of these attacks against us are based on falsehood or 
distortion; but the undeniable existence of racial discrimination gives 
unfriendly governments the most effective kind of ammunition for their 
propaganda warfare.141 
The brief concluded by stating that “the existence of discrimination against 
minority groups in the United States has an adverse effect upon our relations 
with other countries.  Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist 
propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the 
intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.”142 
Thus the Court, as it was deciding Brown, had to appreciate that racial 
conditions had changed since the time of Plessy v. Ferguson and that the 
nation needed the Court to give constitutional sanction to the change.  Just as 
the Charlotte News would tell the people of North Carolina after Brown had 
been decided, so too the Court itself in analyzing the case knew that it  
“somehow . . . must keep the sweep of human history in [its] perspective, must 
apply its intelligence coolly and dispassionately, and must find the resources 
for giving all . . . children equality of education.”143  In short, the materials 
existed for deciding Brown v. Board of Education in the dominant realist mode 
of displaying how the Court was changing law in response to societal need.  It 
would have been easy for the Court to explain why, to avoid a pending train 
wreck, the caboose had to remain attached to the train riding down the track of 
equality. 
Indeed, in his column in the New York Times published the day after the 
Brown decision was handed down, James Reston tried to draft the opinion that 
the Court might have written.  Entitled A Sociological Decision, Reston 
observed that the Court had “rejected history, philosophy and custom as the 
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major basis for its decision and accepted instead Justice Benjamin N. 
Cardoza’s [sic] test of contemporary social justice.”144  In a document that 
“read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme Court 
opinion,”145 the decision, according to Reston: 
[A]dded one more illustration to Justice Cardoza’s [sic] power of prophecy: 
“When the social needs demand one settlement rather than another,” he said, 
“there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice 
custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends. 
“From history and philosophy and custom, we pass, therefore, to the force 
which in our day and generation is becoming the greatest of them all, the 
power of social justice which finds its outlet and expression in the method of 
sociology . . . . 
“The final cause of law is the welfare of society . . . .”146 
But the Brown opinion did not say what Reston’s column said, at least not 
as thoroughly and eloquently.  It did not identify itself as part of a line of 
decisions growing out of Justice Cardozo’s method of sociology.  Nor did it 
emphasize the social facts, which Professors Cottrol, Diamond, Dudziak, and 
Ware have so eloquently elaborated, that demanded an end to formal, de jure 
segregation.  Perhaps Brown would have been criticized as political rather than 
legal if it had done so; indeed, the leading scholar of the case understands 
Reston’s column to have so criticized it.147  But, in retrospect, it seems that the 
Court did not even try to avoid criticism by arguing that it had to do what it 
did.  Why? 
III 
A. 
We will never know for sure.148  Aware of the importance and sensitivity 
of the case, the Justices were very secretive in their discussions about Brown.  
They did not resolve the case in the conference meeting after argument, but in 
subsequent, private, often one-on-one conversations.149  Thus, even the sketchy 
conference notes kept by Justices Burton, Clark, Douglas, and Jackson do not 
tell the full story. 
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We can begin to discern the story-line only by looking at two important 
cases that occurred in the years leading up to Brown.  When we do, we will 
have a better understanding of why the Court did not rest the Brown opinion on 
Cardozo’s jurisprudential approach.  We also will come to see something 
morally problematic about Cardozo’s method of sociology. 
The first case was Korematsu.150  As I have already suggested, the six-man 
majority (Justices Black, Stone, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Rutledge) had 
grounded its decision on wartime military needs.  But in this instance, pursuit 
of Cardozo’s approach produced three vociferous dissents.  I will make only 
the briefest mention of two of the dissents by Justices Owen Roberts151 and 
Frank Murphy,152 who labeled the internment policy racist, because neither 
justice would be a member of the Brown court.  I will focus on the third dissent 
because I think it explains why its author, Justice Robert Jackson, reacted to 
Brown as he did.  And, Jackson’s reaction was profoundly important to the 
form the Brown opinion took. 
In Korematsu, Jackson was prepared to accept the claim of military 
necessity.  He wrote: 
When an area is so beset that it must be put under military control at all, the 
paramount consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than legal.  
The armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution.  The 
very essence of the military job is to marshal physical force, to remove every 
obstacle to its effectiveness, to give it every strategic advantage.  Defense 
measures will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind civil 
authority in peace. . . . 
But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would 
I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient. 
. . . . 
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and 
detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction.  But a judicial construction of 
the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to 
liberty than the promulgation of the order itself.  A military order, however 
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency.  Even 
during that period, a succeeding commander may revoke it all.  But once a 
judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the 
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the 
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the 
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transporting 
American citizens.  The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an 
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urgent need.  Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our own 
law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.  All who observe the work of 
courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described as “the tendency of a 
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.”  A military commander may 
overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we review 
and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.  
There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its 
own image.153 
Jackson accordingly urged that the judiciary should not interfere with the 
military’s execution of its responsibilities for national defense by, for example, 
enjoining the internment program.154  At the same time, he concluded that it 
was wrong to allow society’s military needs to alter constitutional law.155  To 
preserve the integrity156 of the legal caboose, he proposed that it be detached 
from the societal train.  Buried in his proposal was an awareness that, while 
societal needs and values ultimately would dictate the course of politics, 
something else had to determine the direction of the law. 
Within a few years, it was plain that Justice Jackson had been right.  
Korematsu was a grievous mistake.  A year after the majority opinion came 
down, it was subjected to intense criticism.  Four years later, Congress enacted 
the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act, which, in giving compensation 
for some of the losses internees had suffered, implicitly recognized the wrong 
that had been done.157  By the end of his career, at least one of the Justices in 
the majority, William O. Douglas, had publicly admitted his error.158 
Earl Warren was another leader who quickly concluded that the internment 
of Japanese-Americans had been a mistake.  Although he had played a more 
active role than anyone else in instituting the relocation program,159 Warren 
felt that “everybody who had anything to do with the relocation of the 
Japanese, after it was all over, had something of a guilty consciousness about 
it.”160  Warren, for one, “wanted to show that it wasn’t a racial thing” and to 
justify it as “a defense matter,”161 but he was less than fully successful.  As a 
result, he stated in his memoirs that he “deeply regretted the removal order” 
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and his own part “advocating it. . . .  It was wrong to react so impulsively 
without positive evidence of disloyalty.”162 
All this made legal arguments about advancing societal needs somewhat 
suspect, and when such arguments were offered in a major case that came to 
the Court just one year before Brown, they were rejected.163  That case, 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, arose in 1952 when the 
administration of President Harry Truman, in the midst of the Korean War, 
seized control of the nation’s steel mills in order to prevent a work stoppage 
that it claimed would impede war efforts.164  It was the same argument of 
military necessity that had been made in Korematsu and, in a sense, in Gobitis.  
As Chief Justice Fred Vinson noted for himself and two other justices in 
dissent, “the central fact of this case” was “that the Nation’s entire basic steel 
production would have shut down completely if there had been no Government 
seizure” and that such “a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and 
imperil our national defense.”165  Vinson accordingly concluded that “if the 
President has any power under the Constitution to meet a critical situation . . . , 
there is no basis whatever for criticizing the exercise of such power in this 
case.”166  Like Cardozo, Vinson wanted to interpret the Constitution not as a 
series of “doctrinaire concept[s],” but with “elasticity of adjustment, in 
response to the practical necessities of government.”167 
The majority of his colleagues, including four who would play key roles in 
Brown—Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson—disagreed.  
Justice Douglas, for one, had “no doubt that the emergency which caused the 
President to seize these steel plants was one that bore heavily on the country.  
But the emergency did not create power.”168  Thus, in Douglas’s view, the 
Court could not decide the case in whatever fashion would “deal most 
expeditiously with the present crisis” and could not “rewrit[e]” the 
Constitution “to suit the political conveniences of the present emergency.”169 
Justice Jackson was equally concerned that the Constitution not be 
manipulated to promote a short-term national interest.  It was vital, according 
to Jackson, not “to emphasize transient results . . . and lose sight of enduring 
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consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Republic.”170  
Accordingly he concluded that: 
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate [was] more sinister and 
alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely 
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over 
the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation’s 
armed forces to some foreign venture.171 
A third justice, Felix Frankfurter, began his analysis by recognizing that, of 
course, the content of the Constitution was “not to be derived from an abstract 
analysis” or in “disregard [of] the gloss which life has written upon” it.172  But, 
in the end, quoting Justice Brandeis, he agreed with Justices Douglas and 
Jackson that the Constitution was adopted “not to promote efficiency but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”173  Justice Black, writing the opinion 
of the Court, similarly rejected the Administration’s claim that the meaning of 
the Constitution should be altered “to avert a national catastrophe which would 
inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production.”174 
B. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube was decided in June 1952.  Thus, when the 
Court met in conference in December 1952, and then in December 1953, to 
discuss Brown, Cardozo’s concept of societal need as a basis for judicial 
decision-making was not in vogue among those in the room.  Chief Justice 
Vinson, the man who had been most willing to follow that approach in 
Youngstown, was dead and had been replaced by Earl Warren.175 
The new Chief Justice led off the discussion by reporting his morally 
grounded conclusion: 
[T]he principle of segregation and separate but equal rests upon the basic 
premise that the Negro race is inferior. . . . 
I don’t see how we can . . . set one group apart from the rest and say that they 
are not entitled to exactly the same treatment as all others.  To do so is contrary 
to Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Those amendments 
were intended to make those who were once slaves equal with all others.176 
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The senior member of the Court, Hugo Black, who was absent from the 
1953 conference, had expressed an identical view during the conference 
following the first argument of Brown in December 1952.  He stated, “I am 
compelled to say for myself that I can’t escape the view that the reason for 
segregation is the belief that Negroes are inferior.  I do not need books to say 
that.”177 As he had known earlier, “segregation ‘was Hitler’s creed—he 
preached what the South believed.’”178 Black, in the December 1952 
discussion of Brown, then went on: 
I am also compelled to say for myself that the Civil War Amendments have as 
their basic purpose the abolition of such castes. . . . 
If I have to meet it, I can’t go contrary to the truth that the purpose of these 
laws is to discriminate on account of color.  The Civil War Amendments were 
intended to stop that.179 
Justice Douglas, another key figure, agreed with Warren and Black.  For 
him, segregation was “a simple problem.  Race and color cannot be a 
constitutional standard for segregating the schools.”180  Justice Harold Burton 
similarly agreed that “segregation violate[d] equal protection” and that it was 
“not reasonable to educate people separately for a joint life.”  Justice Burton 
was prepared to “go the full length to upset segregation.”181  For Justice 
Sherman Minton, the “only justification for segregation [was] the inferiority of 
the Negro,” and the “Fourteenth Amendment, which was intended to wipe out 
the badges of slavery and inferiority,” required “equal rights, not separate but 
equal.”182 
The moralistic approach of these five justices could have provided the 
Court with a legally sound basis for its decision.  It would only have required 
the Court to find as a fact something that surely was true—that the purpose of 
segregation was to discriminate against African-Americans—and to reach an 
historical judgment that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had been 
intended to bar such discrimination.  But the theory raised a problem—namely, 
four of the justices were not prepared to accept it. 
Chief Justice Warren’s most critical goal in Brown was achieving 
“unanimity and uniformity, even if we have some differences.”183  Justice 
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Frankfurter, always a key member of the Court, agreed with Warren’s goal,184 
and it became the driving force in the drafting of the opinion.185  The goal 
compelled Warren, as he wrote the opinion, to refrain from making statements 
that might antagonize other justices and lead them to dissent or to write 
separate concurrences.  As Justice Douglas, a firm vote in support both of 
desegregation and of unanimity, suggested at the December 1953 conference 
following reargument, achieving unanimity required that the opinion should 
not “try to anticipate too much,” but should say as little as possible.186  Three 
other justices who strongly favored desegregation—Hugo Black, Harold 
Burton, and Sherman Minton—did not disagree.187 
But unanimity did not, in fact, exist.  Justice Stanley Reed disagreed that 
segregation rested “on a theory of racial inferiority,”188 and a long line of cases 
going back to Fletcher v. Peck cautioned against judicial inquiries into 
legislative motive or purpose.189  Justice Frankfurter, moreover, questioned 
“[h]ow . . . Black kn[e]w what the framers of the Civil War Amendments 
meant.”190  Only six years earlier, Black had failed to persuade the majority on 
a parallel claim that the original intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
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framers directed the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.191  In short, 
the theory that segregation rested on racial inferiority and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment therefore outlawed it seemed unlikely to produce a unanimous 
opinion. 
Three justices presented Warren with particularly great problems in his 
search for unanimity.  Robert Jackson’s position, which was a reworking of 
Cardozo’s sociological jurisprudence, was especially interesting and bears 
quotation at length.  According to Jackson: 
Cardozo said that much of constitutional interpretation is partly statutory 
construction and partly politics.  This is a political question.  To me personally, 
this is not a problem.  But it is difficult to make this other than a political 
decision. . . . I don’t know how to justify the abolition of segregation as a 
judicial act. 
. . . . 
The problem is to make a judicial basis for a congenial political 
conclusion. . . . As a political decision, I can go along with it—but with a 
protest that it is politics.192 
Thus, the suggestion was that Jackson would file a separate opinion if the 
Court’s opinion rested on a strong legal argument or otherwise asserted too 
much. 
Justice Tom Clark, like Jackson, was willing to join a judgment 
invalidating segregation.  But on the issue of the form that the opinion should 
take, Clark took a position opposite Jackson’s.  In his view, the case could not 
be handled “by a brief policy statement.  There [was] a danger of violence if 
this [was] not well handled.”193  The final justice, Stanley Reed, initially 
announced that he would dissent from any decision outlawing segregation.194 
Thus, there was no consensus, and the justices kept discussing the case 
informally for several months.  Chief Justice Warren did not begin writing the 
Court’s opinions in Brown and in the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe195 
until April, but he worked quickly and circulated his opinions on May 7, with a 
memo indicating that they “were prepared on the theory that the opinions 
should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, 
above all, non-accusatory.”196  Justices Black, Douglas, Burton, Clark, and 
Minton promptly joined the drafts.  It was also clear that Justice Frankfurter 
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would join, although perhaps after requesting changes in phraseology.197  That 
left Justice Jackson, who had been hospitalized with a heart attack, as the key 
vote. 
Warren personally delivered his draft opinions to Jackson in the 
hospital.198  When Warren left, Jackson read the opinion in Brown and, in the 
words of his law clerk, was “greatly relieved.”199  When Jackson then asked his 
clerk for his view, the clerk responded that he “wished that it had more law in 
it but [he] didn’t find anything glaringly unacceptable in it.”200  The opinion’s 
strength was that it was “simple and unobtrusive” and reflected a “keen sense” 
of what could be said “without getting everybody’s back up.”201  Jackson 
agreed to join the opinion in return for Warren’s adding a reference to the 
success of African-Americans in many fields of endeavor202—a societal fact 
important to a justice influenced by Cardozo and a fact about which, as we 
have seen, Jackson had been concerned in a memo he had drafted shortly after 
the Brown cases had been argued. 
We might wonder why Jackson did not publish a concurring opinion or, at 
least, insist on more concessions as the price for joining the Chief Justice’s 
opinion.  It appears that his heart attack slowed him down; moreover, as his 
somewhat disjointed memo shows, he had no vision of what the reasoning 
behind the Brown judgment ought to be.  In any event, Warren’s opinion 
contained no strong assertions of law of the sort to which Jackson had 
indicated he would object, and hence there was little reason for him to object. 
After visiting Jackson in the hospital on May 10, Justice Frankfurter also 
joined Warren’s opinion.203  It is significant that Frankfurter joined as late as 
he did, after all the other justices except Stanley Reed were on board.  His 
delay gave him less bargaining power.  Of all the justices, Frankfurter 
presumably was the one most likely to insist that the opinion contain legally 
rigorous, reasoned arguments in support of its result.  But Frankfurter also 
cared about unanimity.  To insist that the Chief Justice make significant 
changes in his opinion would risk that others might withdraw their support 
from any revised opinion.  Frankfurter had little choice but to join. 
With Frankfurter and Jackson aboard, only Stanley Reed was left.  The 
Chief Justice paid him a visit, emphasized the need for unanimity, and asked 
Reed to reconsider.204  Reed did reconsider, and “[f]or the good of the country, 
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he put aside his own basis for dissent.”205  Eight days after Warren had first 
circulated his draft, the Court gave it final approval, and two days later, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren announced it from the bench.206 
Regrettably, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown, which took shape in 
response to the moral concerns of several of the justices and to the Court’s 
perception of the nation’s needs and changing values, was almost devoid of 
reasoning, either moral or sociological.  After outlining the procedural posture 
of the case, the inconclusive history of the Fourteenth Amendment until its 
definitive interpretation in Plessy v. Ferguson, and the importance of education 
in Twentieth-Century American life, the Chief Justice finally came to the 
question presented: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race . . . deprive the children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities?”207 Relying on a trial court finding that 
“[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children” that “affects the[ir] 
motivation . . . to learn” and thereby tends to retard their “educational and 
mental development,” the Court concluded that segregation was designed to 
and did, in fact, “generate[] a feeling of inferiority . . . [on the part of African-
American children] that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”208  The words were rhetorically powerful, but the legal 
reasoning thin; nonetheless, Plessy was effectively overruled. 
In particular, the novice Chief Justice, who had spent the last decade and 
more of his career in high political office, from which he almost certainly had 
not paid careful attention to legal realist arguments about whether law should 
respond to changing societal values and needs,209 failed to make such 
Cardozian arguments explicit in his opinion.  He likewise failed to elaborate 
the moral argument that had driven him to his result—that the purpose of 
segregation was to keep African-Americans in a position of subordination and 
that subordination is unconstitutional.  His colleagues, perhaps out of respect 
for their new Chief and perhaps out of fear of fracturing the unanimity of the 
Court, did little to press the arguments on him. 
Chief Justice Warren also placed little weight on precedent.  He did cite 
Sweatt v. Painter210 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education,211 but his ability to rely on precedent was limited because the most 
important precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson,212 supported the opposite result and 
 
 205. Interview with George Mickum, quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at 698. 
 206. KLUGER, supra note 102, at 698. 
 207. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 208. Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation omitted). 
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thus had to be overruled, although he did not explicitly overrule it.  Nor could 
he rely on the legislative history of the Civil War Amendments because, as 
Justice Frankfurter had insisted and the Brown opinion frankly admitted, the 
legislative history was inconclusive.213  Finally, while Warren expressed the 
conclusions of various psychologists about the relationship between 
segregation and feelings of inferiority on the part of blacks,214 he presented the 
conclusions as psychological fact rather than as legal principle.  The end result 
was an opinion with little reasoning of any sort on which to rely. 
C. 
In view of its lack of reasoning, the Chief Justice’s opinion in Brown v. 
Board of Education became an easy target for the likes of Senator James 
Eastland of Mississippi, who called it a “legislative decision by a political 
court,”215 and Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia, who accused the Court 
of “ignor[ing] all law and precedent and usurp[ing] from the Congress and the 
people the power to amend the Constitution, and from the Congress the 
authority to make the laws of the land.”216  Meanwhile ninety-six members of 
Congress were drafting the Southern Manifesto, which declared that the nine 
justices had undertaken “to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted 
their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.”217 
These criticisms were not unique: “the Warren opinion in Brown 
precipitated a constitutional firestorm the likes of which the nation had not 
seen at least since the Taney opinion in Dred Scott.”218  Indeed, by the end of 
the decade, the attack on Brown had reached into the academy.  During a two-
year period, two cycles of the Holmes lectures delivered at Harvard Law 
School and a response by a then-young professor at Yale, Louis H. Pollak, who 
has honored us by participating in this symposium, brought the debate 
regarding Brown, and the failings of the Chief Justice’s opinion, to the 
forefront of academic thought.  Significantly, we can see in the second lecture 
and in Professor Pollak’s response, the emergence of the approach to judicial 
decision-making that subsequently would be elaborated by Ronald Dworkin in 
Law’s Empire. 
The first of the two Holmes Lectures was given by Judge Learned Hand, 
who levied the typical accusation that the Court had “assume[d] the role of a 
 
 213. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489. 
 214. See id. at 494, 494 n.11. 
 215. Statement of Senator James Eastland (Miss.), quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at 710-
11. 
 216. Statement of Governor Herman Talmadge (Ga.), quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at 
710. 
 217. Southern Manifesto (March 12, 1956), quoted in COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra 
note 117, at 187-88. 
 218. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 210. 
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third legislative chamber” by its decision in Brown.219  In Hand’s view, the 
judicial power in constitutional cases extended no further than the enforcement 
of specific, unambiguous textual provisions of the Constitution itself.220  
Brown clearly was not such a case.  Thus, Hand concluded that the Warren 
Court had simply “‘overrule[d]’ the ‘legislative judgment’ of states by its own 
reappraisal of the relative values at stake”221— that the Court had merely 
engaged in the same process of weighing values that had produced segregation 
in the first place.222 
The second Holmes lecture was delivered by Professor Herbert Wechsler, 
who sought to respond to Hand.  The “problem” for Wechsler was not in the 
result of Brown, but “strictly in the reasoning of the opinion.”223  Wechsler 
understood that “courts in constitutional determinations face issues that are 
inescapably ‘political’—political . . . in that they involve a choice among 
competing values or desires.”224  What Wechsler, echoing Justice Jackson, 
found crucial was “not the nature of the question but the nature of the answer 
that may validly be given by the courts.”225  Courts, he argued, had to support 
their “choice of values by the type of reasoned explanation . . . intrinsic to 
judicial action.”226  Courts, in other words, had to choose values on the basis of 
“neutral principles—by standards that transcend the case at hand.”227 
 
 219. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 
1958, at 55 (1958) [hereinafter THE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 220. The statement in the text was Hand’s main claim in the THE BILL OF RIGHTS, see id. at 
48, 66-67, and in his first draft of his lecture, Hand did not mention Brown.  However, his then 
law clerk, Ronald Dworkin, who disagreed with Hand’s main claim, kept calling Hand’s attention 
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of Hercules (see DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 239) for whom Hand was the model, Hand 
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GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 664-72 (1994), which, in Dworkin’s 
view, complements his recollection of how Hand came to analyze Brown as he did.  For the 
efforts of other law clerks to induce Hand, after he had delivered the THE BILL OF RIGHTS lecture, 
to recognize the error of his approach, see Scott I. Messenger, Law Clerks and the Crafting of 
Judicial Reputation: A Cultural History of a Legal Institution, at 33-36 (forthcoming 2004) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University). 
 221. THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 219, at 54. 
 222. See id. at 39. 
 223. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 32 (1959). 
 224. Id. at 15. 
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 226. Id. at 15-16. 
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When Wechsler examined Warren’s opinion, he found the result supported 
only by lower-court fact findings and by a footnote reference to the work of 
sociologists.228  Perhaps, some neutral principle undergirded the opinion, but 
Wechsler could not find the principle because Warren had not expressed it.  
Thus, for Wechsler, Brown v. Board of Education reflected a political and not 
a legal judgment.  But he opened up the possibility that Brown could be 
rendered legitimate if someone could provide a legal reason for its political 
result.229 
Louis Pollak jumped into the opening by crafting a doctrinally solid 
alternative to Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in his article, Racial 
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler.230  
Pollak made the point that others had made—that the policy underlying 
segregation laws was “the impermissible one of nourishing race prejudice.”231  
But in his alternative to the Chief Justice’s opinion, Pollak also wrote: 
“All others can see and understand this.  How can we properly shut our minds 
to it?”  We see little room for doubt that it is the function of Jim Crow laws to 
make identification as a Negro a matter of stigma.  Such governmental 
denigration is a form of injury the Constitution recognizes and will protect 
against.232 
Moreover, the opinion Pollak drafted for the Brown Court did not rest on this 
observation alone.  It rested as well on a legal point that all “‘restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.’”233  
That suspicion could be overcome only by showing that the states had a 
legitimate and compelling policy reason for the restriction, and, in the case of 
segregation, no such reason existed.  On the contrary, as Pollak had shown and 
everybody knew, the reason for segregation was not a legitimate one at all. 
The opinion that then Professor, now Judge Pollak wrote for the Court was 
a powerful early statement of the two-tier equal protection analysis with which 
we have become so familiar.  Segregation laws, as racial classifications, 
triggered strict scrutiny and put the burden of proof on the Southern states to 
 
 228. See Wechsler, supra note 223, at 32-33. 
 229. A decade later Wechsler concluded that Brown and subsequent cases had come to stand 
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 231. Id. at 26. 
 232. Id. at 28 (citations omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 
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demonstrate the legitimacy of their laws.  It was a burden the South obviously 
could not meet.  Hence their laws were unconstitutional. 
Pollak’s article thus provided an easy and elegant solution to the problem 
of justifying the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.  He might 
have ended the article with that solution.  But he did not.  He also tacked on a 
three-page conclusion, the thrust of which is central to the thesis of this Article. 
The conclusion asked what Wechsler meant by “neutral principles.”234  Did 
Wechsler require only that judges write opinions that were “disinterested, 
reasoned, and comprehensive of the full range of like constitutional issues” and 
that “plainly and fully articulate[d] the real bases of decision”?235  If so, the 
opinion Pollak drafted for Brown presumably would have satisfied Wechsler’s 
criteria.  Pollak suspected, however, that Wechsler meant more.236  He 
suspected Wechsler also meant that judges ought “‘not draw’” on their 
“‘merely personal and private notions’” but should “‘achieve . . . 
objectivity.’”237  If so, Pollak disagreed.  In his view, “judicial neutrality” did 
“not preclude the disciplined exercise by a Supreme Court Justice of that 
Justice’s individual and strongly held philosophy.”238  Indeed, he appears to 
have understood that judges could not decide anything without recourse to 
their “individual . . . philosophy.”239 
With Judge Pollak’s article, we enter the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century—the jurisprudential era dominated by Ronald Dworkin rather than 
Benjamin Cardozo.  I lack the evidence to claim that Pollak’s article caused 
others to change the way they thought about the role of judges in constitutional 
adjudication.  But, at the very least, it reflected a new way that a young 
generation of academics, like Pollak’s soon-to-be colleague Dworkin,240 were 
beginning to think.241 
 
 234. Id. at 32. 
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note 43, at 15-30, 381-89. 
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In what ways did this young generation reject Cardozo and develop a new 
jurisprudence?  There were two.  First, they rejected Cardozo’s assumption that 
judges or even social scientists could objectively determine society’s needs and 
values.  Pluralism and relativism became dominant in American thought, as 
“[p]hilosophers made the idea of an objective social science increasingly 
untenable.”242  Thus, Robert A. Dahl’s A Preface to Democratic Theory, 
published three years before Pollak’s article, grounded democracy in 
pluralism,243 while three years after Pollak’s article, Thomas S. Kuhn 
published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which maintained that, even 
in the physical sciences, the relativistic assumptions of researchers 
significantly impacted their results.244  For legal academics attuned to these 
developments in other disciplines, Cardozo’s jurisprudence became 
implausible. 
Second, the young academics placed their faith in individual moral 
judgment.  The decade of the 1960s would be the era of youthful protest 
carried out not because society wanted it or had expressed any need for it, but 
because the protesters could not morally tolerate society’s impositions on 
them.  Many in the legal academy applauded, or at least tolerated, morally 
grounded protest;245 indeed, the problem that required explanation was not 
individual moral protest, but opposition to protest.246 
By the 1960s, Brown v. Board of Education had become central in the 
thinking of these young academics.  It had become the “big” case that could 
not be ignored; no theory of the judicial function was acceptable unless it 
explained why Brown had been rightly decided.  Brown has remained a “big” 
case ever since and the progenitor of a vast scholarly literature.247 
 
“that the Negro race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by the laws of the states” 
and that “segregation is a massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, by state 
law.”  On this “awkwardly simple” “scheme of reasoning,” Brown’s judgment, in Professor 
Black’s view, could be sustained.  Id. 
In stating the obvious in print for the first time—something that Earl Warren’s desire to obtain the 
Court’s unanimous support had precluded him from saying—Charles Black was seen in 1960 as 
having made an important contribution to the debate over the lawfulness of Brown.  But we now 
know that Charles Black added nothing analytically that Hugo Black had not already contributed, 
and accordingly I have not discussed his article in the text. 
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It is, of course, impossible to explore all of this literature within the scope 
of a single article, and it would serve no point to do so.  The point I want to 
make can be seen simply by examining a recent book in which nine leading 
scholars of constitutional law offer suggestions for how the Court should have 
drafted the Brown opinion.248  I will put aside the draft proposed by Derrick 
Bell, to which I will return later, and concentrate for now on the other eight.  
These eight, in common, strive to present either traditional doctrinal analyses 
in support of Brown or philosophical justifications grounded in political 
morality.  None of the eight make arguments grounded in Cardozo’s method of 
sociology.249 
Two of the proposed drafts—by John Hart Ely and Cass Sunstein—rely on 
the two-tier equal protection analysis first advanced by Judge Pollak in his 
1959 response to Herbert Wechsler.  Starting, as did Pollak, from Korematsu v. 
United States,250 they argue that segregation laws, as racial classifications, 
triggered strict scrutiny and put the burden of proof on the Southern states to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of their laws.251  They conclude that the South’s 
failure to meet that burden rendered its segregation laws unconstitutional.252 
Michael McConnell tells a different legalist story—an originalist one.  He 
asserts that Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which 
outlawed segregation on common carriers and in public accommodations,253 
demonstrates that when Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1866 it understood the amendment to prohibit segregation.254  Although I find 
McConnell’s originalist argument less than compelling,255 the important point 
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for present purposes is that he, like everyone else who is striving to justify the 
outcome in Brown, finds it necessary to turn to some jurisprudential approach 
other than Cardozo’s method of sociology. 
Drew Days and Catharine MacKinnon agree with McConnell that the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment must be found in its history, but they 
make only a very general claim about what that history shows.  They claim that 
the Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make 
African-Americans equal citizens of the United States and to prohibit racial 
discrimination against them.256  Days and MacKinnon then adopt the 
observation first made by Justice Black that the purpose and effect of 
segregation was to disadvantage African-Americans and to keep them at the 
bottom of a racist hierarchy.257 
That leaves three other draft opinions—by Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, 
and Frank Michelman.258  In essence, all three eschew analysis of specific 
doctrinal and factual issues and strive to elaborate the design of the 
“democratic republic contemplated by our Reconstruction Constitution,”259 if 
not by the Constitution of 1787 itself.  What follows are Michelman’s words, 
which easily could have been written by Ronald Dworkin, regarding the 
decision to outlaw racial segregation in all its forms throughout the United 
States.  He explained: 
[The decision] finally comes to rest on an attribution of national purpose and 
commitment for which no internal legal-textual or textual-historical 
demonstration can be found.  Decision becomes a matter of attributing or not 
attributing to the Constitution, from its very beginnings, an overriding purpose 
and premise of excluding caste institutions from these shores, a premise that 
most Americans today doubtless would trace to the Declaration of 
Independence.260 
So understood, Brown reaffirms a deep philosophical understanding of what 
America, as a nation, is about. 
IV 
At this point, it might be useful to summarize my historical tale.  In 1921, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo published The Nature of the Judicial Process, in which 
he argued that judges, at bottom, should base their decisions on the needs and 
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values of society viewed as a whole.261  Cardozo’s approach remained 
dominant into the early 1950s, was known to the justices who decided Brown 
v. Board of Education, and contributed to the unanimous result to which they 
came.  But Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court did not clearly and 
articulately express this method of sociology.  And, when the Chief Justice’s 
opinion was criticized, no one turned to that method to blunt the criticism.  
Scholars defended Brown on other grounds.  The ultimate defense, grounded in 
what Cardozo called the method of philosophy,262 reads the Constitution as a 
reflection of “an overriding purpose and premise of excluding caste institutions 
from these shores.”263 
A. 
This history, I believe, contains two lessons.  I already have hinted at the 
first.  This lesson is that Cardozo’s method of sociology—the method of 
conforming law to the needs and values of society—is intrinsically 
progressive, although never radical.  In contrast, Dworkin’s approach of 
permitting judges to rely on their understanding of sound political morality 
allows them to engage in radical as well as progressive change.  It also 
legitimates judicial decisions that are conservative or even reactionary. 
Cardozo’s approach is progressive in the sense that it ensures that as 
society changes the law will change in tandem.  If, as typically happens, people 
look back on the social change that has occurred as progress, they will also 
view the law that both contributed and responded to the change as progressive.  
This is a cheap argument, but it is not unimportant.  I do not know, for 
example, whether societal changes during the course of the Twentieth Century 
that have disconnected sexual activity from reproduction ultimately represent 
progress or sin.  But most people who look back on the Twentieth Century tend 
to think that life was better at the end than at the beginning of the century; they 
tend, that is, to think of the Twentieth Century as a time of progress.  And legal 
decisions that promoted or ratified that progress, such as Griswold v. 
Connecticut,264 Roe v. Wade,265 and Lawrence v. Texas,266 similarly are viewed 
as progressive. 
It is possible to reach a similar judgment about progress toward racial 
justice.267  No one can doubt that socio-political changes during the course of 
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the Twentieth Century made it essential for the United States to pursue a path 
of racial equality.  At the outset of the century, the United States was under no 
military threat from foreign powers, because the British navy controlled the 
seas and Britain had no interest in invading.268  Moreover, America was 
economically self-sufficient.269  Today, on the other hand, we must import 
essential goods from overseas and can protect ourselves from foreign attack 
only by being the strongest military power in the world.270  Isolationism no 
longer is possible; we must be part of—indeed, we must be the leader of—a 
global community that consists overwhelmingly of people of color.  Such 
leadership, in turn, requires fair and equal treatment of racial and ethnic 
minorities at home. 
The amicus briefs of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education 
explicated this connection between American global responsibility and 
domestic racial justice.271  Taken together, the amicus briefs showed that the 
national interest of the American people required racial justice and opportunity 
for people of color—that people of color in the United States had to lead good 
lives so that people of color elsewhere in the world could believe that America 
wanted them to lead good lives as well.272  And the justices, most of whom still 
were familiar with Cardozo’s approach of conforming law to the nation’s 
needs and values, knew they had to decide Brown as they did. 
The utility of Cardozo’s approach, even after decades of disuse, emerged 
last Term with special poignancy in the case of Grutter v. Bollinger.273  There, 
the amicus briefs of corporate leaders and retired military officers,274 along 
with the narrow 5-4 majority opinion by Justice O’Connor, explicated even 
more clearly than did Brown the connection between American global 
hegemony and domestic racial justice.  Relying on the briefs, the majority 
opinion noted that “major American businesses have made clear that the skills 
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed 
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through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”275  
Even more significantly, Justice O’Connor observed that the military needed to 
“‘train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a 
racially diverse setting’” and that it could not do so “‘unless the service 
academies and the ROTC use[] limited race-conscious recruiting and 
admissions policies.’”276 
Taken together, the briefs and the O’Connor opinion suggest not only that 
Americans of color must lead good lives so that people of color elsewhere in 
the world can believe that America wants them to lead good lives as well, but 
two further points.  First, white Americans need black Americans to tell the 
world about the good lives they lead and about America’s desire that people of 
color throughout the world should buy American products and thereby lead 
prosperous lives as well.  Second, Americans of color need to be coopted to 
perform many of the lower-paying, less-desirable tasks, such as military 
service, that the maintenance of American global hegemony requires.  Finally, 
the amicus briefs and the O’Connor opinion intimate that whites need to create 
an elite of color to persuade average Americans of color to assume these two 
tasks. 
I must note, parenthetically, that I agree with Justice Ginsburg’s approach 
to affirmative action.277  I tend to regard it as an essential, though far from 
perfectly adequate, remedy for past and ongoing racial discrimination that has 
made it impossible for most Americans of color to compete on fair terms.  I 
imagine it would have been catastrophic for Grutter to have outlawed the 
University of Michigan Law School’s admission system.  Unfortunately, 
though, Justice O’Connor did not see the issue as I do, and O’Connor, not I, 
had the fifth vote.  Moreover, what her opinion implies is true: whites do need 
blacks to perform the functions she suggests for them, and we probably need 
the “‘highly qualified, racially diverse’”278 leaders that only affirmative action 
programs can produce to persuade the black underclass to do their necessary 
jobs.  I cannot, in short, gainsay the power of Cardozo’s method of sociology 
to produce plausible, progressive, and maybe even right results. 
It is equally significant that Cardozo’s jurisprudence will not be of help to 
a justice wishing to dissent from results like those reached in Brown and 
Grutter.  A judge wishing to dissent, like either Stanley Reed in Brown or 
Clarence Thomas in Grutter, will need to do so for other reasons—essentially 
reasons of political morality. 
 
 275. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340. 
 276. Id. (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., supra note 274, 
at 5, 29). 
 277. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2442 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 278. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340 (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., 
supra note 274, at 27). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 835 
Justice Reed had such a reason, wrongheaded as it might have been.  As I 
understand Reed, he simply believed that African-Americans were inferior to 
European-Americans.  “Of course,” Reed conceded, “there is no ‘inferior 
race,’” but he did believe there were “racial differences” and that blacks “may 
be handicapped.”279  “The race came out of slavery a short time ago,” Reed 
noted, and “have not thoroughly assimilated. . . . We must try our best to give 
Negroes benefits.”280  As I analyze the subtext of what I have just quoted, I 
cannot help but see Reed thinking of whites as benevolent parents of childlike 
blacks who need white help so that they might someday transcend racial 
differences and become the equals of whites.  However, they were not yet 
equal, and while they were inferior it made sense to keep them separate.  In 
short, I understand Justice Reed’s paternalism to reflect a deep belief in racial 
inequality—a belief grounded in a philosophical position. 
In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Thomas likewise expressed a 
philosophical point of view, albeit a different one from Justice Reed’s.  He 
quoted an especially eloquent statement of Frederick Douglass: 
“[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I 
perceive, than just, manifested toward us.  What I ask for the negro is not 
benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice.  The American people 
have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us. . . . I have had 
but one answer from the beginning.  Do nothing with us! . . . If the apples will 
not remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, 
if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! . . . And, if the negro 
cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also.  All I ask is, give him a chance 
to stand on his own legs!  Let him alone! . . . [Y]our interference is doing him 
positive injury.”281 
As I understand Justice Thomas’s morally driven position, he sees African-
Americans as in all respects the equals of European-Americans, and believes 
that their equality would manifest itself if whites would only stop oppressing 
them, at times by trying to help them. 
We know how Justice Thomas voted in Grutter v. Bollinger, and we know 
how Justice Reed would have voted if Chief Justice Warren had not persuaded 
him, for the good of the nation, to change his vote.  Conservative and even 
reactionary positions such as theirs will be articulated from the bench routinely 
if the justices understand their job to be one of elaborating what they, as 
philosophers, attribute to the Constitution as its core purpose.  For this reason, 
I am troubled by the shift in academic thinking away from Cardozo’s view that 
law should be attuned to society’s emerging needs and values.  I am concerned 
 
 279. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 175, at 656. 
 280. Id. at 649. 
 281. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2350 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An 
Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
836 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:795 
that, as people with a moral perspective on the law that differs from mine 
increasingly set the Supreme Court’s agenda, results favored by the dissenting 
justices in Grutter and the silent dissenter in Brown will become increasingly 
commonplace. 
B. 
Earlier, when I was discussing the recent book in which nine eminent 
constitutional law scholars proposed drafts of opinions that they think the 
Supreme Court should have announced in Brown, I noted that I was passing by 
the proposal of my colleague, Derrick Bell, and that I would return to it later.  
It is now time to return to an opinion that Bell labeled a dissent. 
Bell does something that major constitutional theorists beginning with 
Charles Black and Lou Pollak have not done in their efforts to champion 
Brown’s result.  He notes the role that Cardozo’s method of sociology played 
in the Court’s decision.  In his words: 
While it is nowhere mentioned in the majority’s opinion, it is quite clear that a 
major motivation for the Court to outlaw racial segregation now when it 
declined to do so in the past is the major boost this decision will provide in our 
competition with communist governments abroad and our fight to uproot 
subversive elements at home.282 
From this Bell drew that more fundamental conclusion that the rights of 
African-Americans “are recognized and protected for only so long as they 
advance the nation’s interests.”283 
Bell’s conclusion can appropriately be seen as an indictment of Cardozo’s 
method of sociology, as well as Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. 
Bollinger and the underlying judgmental processes of the Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education.  Put simply, Bell understands, as did Frederick Douglass 
and Justice Clarence Thomas, that white Americans have always used African-
Americans to advance white interests, even when whites think they are acting 
benevolently.  When judges ask what the nation (that is, the nation’s vast white 
majority) needs and values, they never confer permanent rights on blacks, but 
merely confer temporarily privileges that endure only for so long as the nation 
needs them.284  Grutter v. Bollinger, for example, confers no right on any 
African-American student to attend the University of Michigan Law School; it 
merely allows the law school to admit blacks on different standards than 
whites as long as the good of the law school or the nation requires. 
Professor Bell, along with Justice Thomas, finds this perverse.  As 
proponents of equality, they believe that African-Americans, like all other 
Americans, should possess rights that will endure even after those rights no 
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longer suit the convenience of the majority.285  Bell and Thomas do not see 
whites, as a racial group, being used to promote the good of the nation.  They 
believe, quite correctly, that using blacks, even benevolently, marks blacks as 
less than fully equal.286 
Thinkers like Ronald Dworkin and Frank Michelman avoid this concern.  
Through philosophical analysis of the history of American constitutionalism, 
Dworkin derives an “individual right not to be the victim of official, state-
imposed racial discrimination,”287 while Michelman, with a similar analysis, 
“attribut[es] . . . to the Constitution, from its very beginnings, an overriding 
purpose and premise of excluding caste institutions from these shores.”288  
Both theories are racially neutral and should give neither Professor Bell, 
Justice Thomas, nor anyone who hopes for racial equality cause to criticize 
them.  This neutrality justifies, and might even explain, why the Supreme 
Court and academic commentators, in Brown and its aftermath, shifted away 
from Cardozo’s method of sociology to an approach more like the method of 
philosophy. 
C. 
This approach brings us yet again to Grutter v. Bollinger.  For Bell, 
Dworkin, Michelman, and Thomas, Grutter should represent a truly perverse 
decision.  White Americans need African-Americans to fight their wars for 
them.  They also need nonwhites to sell their products to people of color 
overseas so as to maintain their own high living standards at home.  
Continuing to so use African-Americans, in turn, necessitates the education 
and training of a black elite, which, finally, requires preferential admissions to 
the nation’s leading colleges and graduate schools. 
One side of me rebels at hearing this reasoning.  But the other side of me 
wonders whether any other reasoning could have produced the results in 
Brown and Grutter—results to which I am totally committed.  Derrick Bell, 
Ronald Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and Clarence Thomas all stand committed 
to the principle of equality.  But they have different conceptions of equality, 
and they will not resolve their differences by engaging each other in 
philosophic conversation.  The conception of equality that will dominate the 
Court’s reasoning will be the one most acceptable to the vast majority of the 
American people, and the American people have never been able to concede 
real equality to the descendants of those brought here as slaves. 
Maybe whites can be benevolent, however, to the African-Americans 
whom they need to protect their wealth and safety.  And over time, perhaps, 
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white benevolence might so enrich and empower blacks, as it has so many 
other groups in the past, that they will be enabled to seize the equality that 
whites have refused freely to grant. 
V 
Some may find me unduly optimistic,289 but I do not mean to insist on my 
optimism.  I have only one main conclusion—that since the time of Brown, 
both conservative and liberal jurists have tended to ground their decisions more 
on principles of political morality than on their perception of societal need.  
Because no one set of political principles ever has become permanently 
triumphant in pluralistic America, it follows that, if courts are charged with 
deciding cases on the basis of principle, they sometimes will reach liberal and 
other times conservative results. 
Alternatively, judges might ground decisions not on abstract principle but 
on their understanding of society’s needs, as Justice Cardozo and others did 
beforeBrown and as Justice O’Connor did in Grutter v. Bollinger.  Of course, 
society sometimes can be divided into conflicting groups that do not agree on 
what is needed, and, even when there is general agreement, it might be difficult 
to determine what society’s needs are.  Hence judges can make mistakes.  But 
often, as in Grutter, it is easy to know what is needed, and other times, when 
mistakes are made, as in Bowers v. Hardwick,290 it is possible to correct 
them.291  In the end, legal change will follow in the wake of social change, and 
the law will appear progressive even when judges, perhaps benevolently, 
authorize use of the underprivileged to further the well-being of society as a 
whole. 
I do not know whether, if I were a judge, I would base my decisions on my 
perception of society’s needs and values or on my analysis of right political 
morality.  Because I am not and never will be a judge, I have not had to face 
the question under the real-life conditions of having to give judgment.  My job, 
as an academic scholar, is not to prescribe, but only to describe and analyze 
and thereby help my audience achieve new insight into matters of importance.  
I hope I have done that for you. 
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